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Attorney Compensation in Bankruptcy:

THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION
Kimberly S. Armstrong*
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("the
Code") have few advocates among creditors of individuals and businesses electing to declare bankruptcy. Much criticism
is focused upon the payments of legal
fees out of the estate to the debtor's attorney immediately prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. Were these payments made to another creditor, they might
receive greater scrutiny.
Unlike post-petition legal fees, prepetition fees are not subject to avoidance
by the trustee in bankruptcy or by the
court; therefore, it is customary for bankruptcy attorneys to require that their fees
be paid prior to the filing of the petition.
To recover any outstanding balance remaining at the time of filing, the attorney
must petition the court for payment by the
trustee out of the debtor's estate. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 219, the debtor's petition must contain separate disclosure statements for all attorneys' fees
paid within a year of filing and for the
bankruptcy work itself. The court may examine these disclosure statements and
may deny the payment request or order
the attorney to reimburse the estate. In
either case, the court considers the reasonableness of the fees.
This article outlines the basic procedure used by the bankruptcy and appellate courts to determine reasonable prepetition attorneys' fees and analyzes the
topic under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Attorneys' Fees in General
Attorneys are prohibited from charging
or collecting "clearly excessive fee[s]."1
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-1 06(A) states that "[a]
lawyer shall not enter into an agreement
for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly
excessive fee." The American Bar Association has interpreted this Disciplinary
Rule in only a few opinions, and in no
case has it interpreted this Rule in the
bankruptcy context. 2 Furthermore, the
ABA, the Maryland State Bar Association,
and the local bar associations have published no guidelines for attorneys concerning reasonableness of fees in any situation. In fact, the ABA recommended in
1973 that all state and local bar associations remove "minimum" or "suggested" fee schedules. 3

In order to limit excessive legal fees,
the ABA has recommended that attorneys consider several factors when setting fees. 4 In their review of fee requests,
the courts have established additional
factors. Basically, two methods are utilized. In Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator and Sanitary Corp.,s
the Third Circuit attempted to establish
the first set of guidelines for determining
the reasonableness of fees. The court used
a method commonly known as the "lodestar" method. Reasonableness of the fee
petition is determined by ascertaining the
attorney's normal billing rate and calculating the amount that would be charged
if the rate were multiplied by the number
of the attorney's billed hours. The court
stated that this calculation is "the only
reasonably objective basis for valuing an
attorney's services."6 The figure or lodestar obtained may then be increased or
decreased according to the judge's determination of two subsequent factors:
the probability of success and the quality
of the attorney's work. The judge must
consider the risk of failure inherent in the
case, weighing such considerations as the
outcome of criminal actions against the
same defendants and the novelty of the
issue. The quality of the attorney's work
is determined by the difficulty or complexity of the issues presented, the attorney's ability demonstrated in the courtroom and the recovery obtained.? A
minority of circuits have utilized this
method. 8
A second method has gained more
widespread acceptance. In the seminal
case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., the Fifth Circuit listed twelve
factors to be considered in determining
fees. They are:
(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment due to acceptance of the
case;
(5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limits imposed by client or
circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and results
obtained;

(9) the experience, reputation and
ability of the attorneys;
(10) the "undesirability" of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the
client; and
(12) awards in similar cases.lO
After weighing the twelve factors, the
court will make an award and should explicitly state its reasons for the amount
so awarded,11 so that appellate courts can
determine if the trial judge has abused
his discretinnY

Attorneys' Fees in
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is possibly the only context
in which the court is mandated to protect
the client from the attorney. Until the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was enacted in 1979, bankruptcy cases were
governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 13
Under the 1898 Act, compensation of attorneys was subject to court review under
§ 60(d) and Rule 220. 14 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals utilized that power by
extending the Johnson analysis to bankruptcy proceedings in In Re First Colonial
Corp.1S The inherent sensitivity of bankruptcy proceedings, however, required
further economy in awarding attorneys'
fees. 16 Thus two variations of the Johnson analysis evolved. First, the judge
should keep in mind the overriding policy
of efficient administration of bankruptcy
estates. Since the debtor's attorney does
not act in a private capacity but rather as
an officer of the court, he should not expect to receive as large a fee as he might
in a non-bankruptcy proceeding.1? The
second variation from Johnson stems from
the court's refusal to award "double compensation"-awarding fees to attorneys
who serve the estate in more than one
capacity-which was also prohibited by
the 1898 Act. The court should determine
whether the attorney's application for
compensation contains documentation of
duplicated efforts in the different capacities. 18 With these policy considerations
in mind, the court should then determine
the value of the attorney's services in terms
of the Johnson factors discussed above. 19
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 (the Code), the emphasis has shifted
from giving the judge total discretion to
determine reasonable fees to attempting
to set a standard that the judge may follow. Under § 330 of the Code, 20 the court
must provide notice and hearing and may
then award "reasonable compensation for
actual, necessary services rendered ...
based on the time, the nature, the extent,
and the value of such services, and the
cost of comparable services other than in
a case under this title."21 Thus under the
Code, an attorney need not expect to re-

17
ceive less in a bankruptcy case than in
another case. The customary fees in nonbankruptcy cases become an indicator of
reasonable fees in bankruptcy cases. The
spirit of economy employed under the 1898
Act is no longer a requirement under the
Code. 22
On August 1 , 1983 the New Bankruptcy
Rules and Official Forms went into effect.
Rule 2016 replaced Rule 219 which governed compensation for services rendered. The new rule is identical to Rule
219, except that the subsection concerning the bases for allowance of compensation has been incorporated into § 330,
and the prohibition against sharing compensation has been included in § 504. 23
The substance of the rule, however, has
not been altered.

Payments to the Debtor's
Attorney
The Code provides in § 547 that a
transfer of property of the debtor for an
antecedent debt within ninety days of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition is a preferential transfer. As such, it is avoidable
by the trustee because a debtor is presumed to be insolvent within the ninetyday period and (unless proven otherwise)
any transfer of property during that time
is presumed to work to the benefit of one
creditor and to the detriment of the others.
The trustee is therefore given the power
to demand return of the property.
The debtor's attorney enjoys a particular confidentiality with the client which
may become a breeding ground for mis-

conduct in pre-petition transactions. Congress recognized this problem in Senate
Report No. 95-989 when it stated:
Payments to a debtor's attorney provide serious potential for evasion of
creditor protection provisions of the
bankruptcy laws, and serious potential for overreaching by the debtor's
attorney, and should be subject to
careful scrutiny.24
Because of their relationship with the client,
some attorneys have attempted to circumvent the preference provisions of the
Code by obtaining an attorney's lien upon
certain assets of the debtor, such as his
accounts receivable. As secured creditors, their claim has priority over unsecured creditors. Many courts, however,
have avoided these liens a:s preferential
transfers when there is no evidence presented of perfection of the security interest,25 when the payments are made from
funds obtained through litigation performed by the attorney,26 or when the attorney has knowledge of the impending
bankruptcy.27
The trustee may not avoid the payment
of a debt which is not antecedent, or one
which is made during the ninety-day period, if it is made in the ordinary course
of business and paid within 45 days of
the incurrence of the debt,28 Thus, payment to the debtor's attorney for bankruptcy-related work is not a preferential
transfer and is not avoidable by the trustee.
Because of the threat of overreaching as
discussed in the Senate Report,29 Bankruptcy Courts must be careful to protect
the assets of the estate from depletion. It
may be difficult to detect preferential payments to the attorney since the attorney
prepares the petition for the debtor and
since the attorney may disguise the payments for non-bankruptcy work as part of
the payment for bankruptcy-related matters. The court and the trustee examine
payments made during the preferential
period to another creditor with greater
scrutiny to determine if a fraudulent transfer has occurred. A lighter scrutiny is applied when examining payments to attorneys. Attorneys must affix to the debtor's
petition a statement of their fees and any
unpaid balance due from the debtor's estate. Under § 329, the court may cancel
any agreement for compensation or order
the return of any excess payment if such
payments are deemed to exceed the reasonable value of such services.

Practical Application of Fee
Examinations

Please! Please!

The standard for reasonableness, although subject to the Johnson or lodestar
analysis. and § 330, is nevertheless within
the judge's sound discretion. In the United
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States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Maryland, Baltimore Division, the judge
sets an ideal fee for particular types of
bankruptcy, and issues a Show Cause
order as to why the fee should not be
diminished if the amount listed in the petition exceeds the limit the judge has set.
The court does not disclose the actual
amount of the maximum fees allowable.
While this non-disclosure protects some
bankruptcy estates from overreaching by
the debtor's attorney, it also deprives attorneys of guidelines to determine fair and
equitable fees. In fact, this practice promotes litigation by failing to provide scrupulous attorneys with assistance in setting fees and by chastizing them after the
fees are set. With the immense number
of bankruptcy cases filed each year, there
is little chance that each case will be examined to determine if the fees charged
are reasonable. If there is no objection to
the amount, the court allows the compensation if it does not exceed its limit.
While attorneys have the ethical obligation to charge a reasonable fee,3o without standards to guide them the task is
difficult. There appear to be three standards applied when dealing with attorneys'
fees in bankruptcy: the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Bankruptcy
Code, and case law (such as First Colonial). While these standards appear to
overlap, it is unclear how they are intended to interact, when they are intended to apply, and which takes precedence. If the court determines that a fee
is excessive, should a complaint be filed
with the Ethics Committee? If a fee is
found to be excessive, is it per se unethical? These questions and more need to
be answered.

Conclusion
In order to protect unwary clients and
to prevent subsequent litigation, the local
bar associations should examine attorneys' fees and develop recommendations as to what fees are reasonable. The
present standards in DR 2-106 are
ambiguous: "[a] fee is clearly excessive
when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer
of ordinary prudence would be left with a
definite and firm conviction that the fee is
in excess of a reasonable fee."31 (emphasis added.) Without guidelines, the attorney may, even without so intending,
charge a fee that is later considered to
be excessive. The reluctance on the part
of the bar associations to establish guidelines is an overreaction to the prohibition
against fixing clearly improper minimum
fees. 32
In the absence of sufficient guidelines,
however, attorneys should take it upon
themselves to ascertain reasonable rates
in the community and attempt to keep

them to a minimum. Although the Code
no longer requires economy in fees, the
bankruptcy bar should consider it their
ethical obligation under DR 2-106 to
charge lower-than-normal fees to clients
who contract for their services because
of financial problems. Rather than remaining silent, creditors should also become more involved by objecting to fees
which appear excessive. In many liquidation cases, the amount received by the
debtor's attorney for bankruptcy matters
may equal half of the amount owed to
creditors. These fees, however, do not
trigger the court's alarm by exceeding the
amount set for liquidation cases. Heightened awareness of the ethical obligation
should benefit both the petitioner and the
creditor in many bankruptcy cases.
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Recent Developments
(continued from page 4)
available in divorce and criminal courts:
"The criminal law may vindicate society's
interest in punishing a wrongdoer but it
cannot compensate an injured spouse for
her or his suffering and damages. Divorce
or separation provide escape from tortious abuse but can hardly be equated
with a civil right to redress and compensation for personal injuries." Merenoff V.
Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951,962
(1978).

Justice Couch, joined by Justice Rodowsky, dissented in Boblitz, based on
his belief that such a change would be
best made by the legislature. The majority
held that in the present case there existed
no legislative barrier to the abrogation of
the doctrine, since it was a common law
rule brought about by judicial decisions.
The court further stated that the doctrine
of stare decisis should not be construed
as a prohibition against changing a rule
of law that has become unsound in the
circumstances of modern life.
While the decision in Boblitz may be
viewed as a giant step forward in Maryland tort law, there are circumstances in
which the interspousal immunity rule may
still apply. The court stated that certain
conduct that would be tortious between
strangers would not be tortious between
spouses due to the mutual concessions
implied in the marital relationship. The
doctrine of intra-family tort immunity was
untouched by the Boblitz decision. The
court also limited its holding to cases
sounding in negligence and did not address cases which involved intentional
torts.
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